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Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentelmen. 
It is with great pleasure that I have accepted your invitation to' 
speak to you tonight on "the United Nations and Human Rights. 
The. United Nations Association has long been interested in 
promoting the implementation in Australia of statements of 
Human Rights developed by the United Nations. 
The working conference on the Ratification of the Inter-
national Covenants on Human Rights held in February 1969 was 
the direct result of initiative taken by the United Nations 
Association0 The Conference was organised by a Committee in which more than 100 non-Governmental organisations in 
Australia participated. Those organisations covered a wide 
range of community interest and many shades of political 
opiniono 
The Conference recommended that the Australian 
Government should proceed to the Ratification of the 
International Covenants. It was conscious of the special 
problems created by the Federal system in Australia and 
suggested a number of measures to overcome these difficulties,, 
These included a study of the existing practices on 
ratification where Australian and State powers were involved, 
with special reference to the ambit of the External Affairs 
Power of the Constitution,, The Conference recognised the 
value of entrenching in legal form specific fundamental 
Human Rights in a manner consonant with the international 
standards, and resolved that consideration should be given 
to incorporating a Bill of Rights in the Australian 
Constitution,, 
Now, some five years later, the United Nations 
Association has convened the present seminar. The seminar 
takes place in the context of the debate in Human Rights 
that has followed the introduction of a Human Rights Bill 
last year. As in 1969, a wide spectrum of interests is 
again represented0 
The Labor Government.is firmly committed to the 
protection of Human Rights in Australia. The ultimate goal 
must be a constitutional Bill of Rights, But that is 
necessarily some idstahce away, and the Government has 
already taken those practical steps open to it under existing-
constitutional powers. 
It is also the policy of the Government that the 
International Covenants on Human Rights should be ratified arri 
implemented by Australia and that Australia should press for the 
world-wide adoption of these Covenants. One of the first 
acts of the Government when it took office in 1972 was to sign 
the Covenants. This was followed by the introduction, 
on 21 November 1973, of the Human Rights Bill, the main purpose 
oi which was to implement the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Kights. The Covenant relating to economic, social 
and cultrual_rights, requires nations to progressively implement 
its terms. In contrast, the Covenant on Civil and Political 
•tu.gh.ts requires nations to implement its terms forthwith. 
For centuries men have believed that the recognition 
of- fundamental rights and freedoms forms an indispensable 
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"basis for the development of human personality and civilised 
communities. However, at no time in our history has both the 
denial and recognition of fundamental rights been brought 
into sharper contrast than in the last forty years0 The second world war and the events leading to it focussed attention 
on the need to secure these rights on an international as well 
as national basis„ 
It is useful at this distance in time to recall the 
setting in which the immediate post-war meetings to form the 
United Nations took place. There-has been a denial of Hijunan 
Rights on a scale almost without precedent in history.^ There had 
been genocide, force labour, deprivation of political rights, 
arbitrary arrest, confiscation of property, detention without 
trial and imprisonment on a large scale of those convicted of 
vague political offences. 
Out of all of this emerged an international concern 
for the protection and preservation of rights and freedoms. It 
had become clear that the denial-of basic rights to the 
citizens of a country was a step in the climb to power 
of those who would endanger world peace. Concerted international 
action was therefore seen as necessary to ensure that peace would 
not be endangered through the denial of rights in any country. 
' .'Thus; what was once a matter of purely national concern 
has, with the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945» 
become a matter of international concern. The United 
Nations Charter proclaims that one of the purposes of the 
United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in 
'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction'„ In 
Article 55 and 56 of the charter, the members of the United 
Nations hav pledged themselves to take action, in co-operation 
with the United Nations Organisation, for the promotion of 
universal respect for, and observance of, these rights. They 
have pledged themselves to take this action both 'separately' 
and 'jointly' - that is to say, by individual national action 
as well as by actions of international co-operation. Some of 
the delegations to the San Francisco conference which drew up 
the U.N. Charter considered that, the charter itself should 
contain an international Bill of Rights. While such a Bill 
was not included in the charter, work was commenced 
immediately on this task by the Commission on Human Rights on 
it3 establishment in 1946. The Commission decided that an 
International Bill of Rights should consist of three parts -
a declaration- of Human Rights, a Covenant on Human Rights 
which would transform the principles of the Declaration into 
legal obligations, and international machinery to secure the 
effective observance of the obligations. Two years later, 
in 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted 
the universal declaration of Human Rights. 
The;second and third stages of the International 
Bill were.reached in 1966, with the adoption by the United 
Nations General Assembly of the International Covenants on 
Human Rights, consisting of the International Covenant on 
economic, social and cultural rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Adoption 
of the Optional Protocol to the latter Covenant. 
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3o 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, 
which was adopted unanimously by more than 100 countires, including 
Australia, was the result of nearly twenty years effort. 
It was the subject of intensive debate over this period and it 
represents the consensus of international thinking on the matters 
falling within its scope. The Covenant has had a profound 
influence on other international agreements and on the national 
constitutions of many countries. 
The development of their series of comprehensive 
international instruments on Human Rights must be regarded as one 
of the great achievements of the United Nations. 
Unfortunately, basic rights and freedoms are still denied 
on a large scale in many countires. Apartheid, racial 
discrimination, political trials, arbitrary arrest, suppression 
of dissenting opinion are all too frequent in many countries„ They 
are however, a matter of great international concern because the 
existence of these infringements of rights continues to pose a 
threat to the maintenance of world peace and order. Only by the 
continued efforts, both at the national and the international level, 
of those who believe in freedom, can the area within which rights.are 
effectively guaranteed be enlarged„ 
I turn now to the application of these principles at the 
National level in Australia. I have already said what has been 
done by the present Government since it took office in 1972. While 
these steps have been taken in fulfilment of the programme of the 
A.L.P. Government, they do not represent a partisan political 
approach. Both liberal and labor Governments in Australia 
have, since 1945, supported in the United Nations the development 
of the international instruments on Human Rights. There is not, I 
think, any real opposition in Australia to ratification of the two 
international covenants. The debate that has followed the 
introduction of the Human Rights Bill has centred on the following 
points; 
whether any change in Australian law is required to give 
effect to the Covenant in Civil and Political rights 
whether a Bill of Rights, either entrenches in the 
Constitution or in legislative form, is a desirable 
way to protect Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
whether the External Affairs Power should be used to 
give effect to the Covenant in Australia, 
whether the human rights bill is adequate for its purpose 
I deal first with the question whether any change in 
Australian Law is required. I want to say firmly that I 
believe Changes are required if effect is to be given to the 
Covenant. 
Much has been said about the common law.in Australia already 
giving those rights which the Covenant required. Because there seems 
to be in some quarters almost a blind faith in the magic of the 
common law, it needs to be said and said again that the common law 
itself cannot guarantee individual liberty against legislative 
intrusion. What rights are given by the Common Law can be and 
have been repeatedly overrriden by Parliaments and by local 
Government Councils. But more important still, the Common law 
itself does not always operate to the benefit of those who stand 
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most in need of protection. 
I have already given, in other places, examples of 
the way in which legislation in Australia has cut across rights 
otherwise enjoyed under the common law. Let me remind you 
again of some of them: 
There was a decision by a shire council in Western 
Australia to levy a rate to finance the building 
of a non-denominational place of worship. This 
cut across the religious freedom of the ratepayers 
in the shire the High Court upheld the power of the 
Council to levy the rate under the Local Government 
Act in Western Australia. I understand that the Act 
has since been amended to prevent a repition of the 
incident. 
. Acting under emergency powers legislation in 1964, during 
the Mount Isa strike, the Queensland Government prevented 
•union members from returning to their homes in 
Mount Isa. That legislation is Still on the Statute 
Book. 
During a debate on abortion last year in the House 
of Representatives, a large and peaceful demonstration 
was held outside Parliament House in Canberra by opponents 
of the measure being discussed. Had the Government 
wished to prevent the demonstration, it could 
lawfully have acted to disperse the demonstraters under 
laws in force in the A.C.T. Lest you think there is 
something special in the A.C.T. situation, I should 
tell you that such a demonstration could not have 
taken place in the vicinity of the Parliaments of at least 
some, if not all, of the States without a favourable 
exercise of executive or police discretion. 
There are at least two jurisdictions in Australia where 
police may lawfully enter premises under a general search 
warrant, which is authorised by Statute but which would 
have been unlawful at common law. 
Special laws applying to reserves under the Queensland 
aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders Acts leave those 
whose homes are on the reserves to the discretion of 
officials in respect of conduct on the reserves, 
and even the right to be there. It is no answer to say,', 
as, the Queensland Government says, that these laws have 
been enacted at the request of the aborigines and 
islanders. It is not a satisfactory situation when a 
disadvantaged minority may contract our of rights 
enjoyed by the community at large. 
These are cases where common law freedoms have been 
set aside by Statute. But there are important areas where the 
Common Law has not recognised rights now regarded as significant, 
or where it operates positively to deny fundamental rights. 
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The Common Law, as interpreted by the High 
Court, denies any general right of privacy. 
Thus the Common Law gives little protection 
against the growth of eavesdropping and prying 
by Government Departments, law enforcement 
Authorities, business organisations and 
communicationsmedia. 
„ The Common Law emphasis on freedom of contract and 
the sanctity of contract operates most harshly 
against those who, by lack of education or 
bargaining power or ther disadvantage, stand 
most in need of protection. We only have to look 
at the way in which the common law upheld the 
rights of woners of mines and factories in the 19th 
century to engage children of tender age to work 
for 16 hours or more a day to see how the common 
law in fact has operated in a particular situation. 
When trade unions were formed to give thw worker 
some bargaining power, the common law said that 
the trade unions were illegal because they stood 
in restraint of trade. The rights and freedoms 
that are now enjoyed in the industrial field are 
enjoyed only because the legislature stepped in to 
set aside the common law. 
The common law offers little protection to a man 
on a criminal charge against whom evidence has been 
obtained unlawfully. It is true that the judge has 
a discretion to refuse to admit evidence of this 
kind if he considers ti to be unduly prejudicial 
to the defendant. It is true also that this is a 
discretion that is rarely exercised. 
According to the common law, a person may be legally 
represented in Court. But the Common law does not 
give substance to this right by guaranteeing him 
representation in a case where he cannot afford 
to pay the fees. He is left to often inadequate 
legal aid schemes or to depend on the generosity 
of the legal profession. 
One could go on multiplying examples of the way in which the 
Common law fails effectively to guarantee the rights specified 
in the covenant on civil and political rights. Let me say 
that I regard it as a great danger to the protection of rights 
in Australia to believe that they are adequately protected by the 
common law and that we need take no further action to 
give effective substance to those rights. 
As a further development of the heresy that the common 
law gives adequate protection, it is argued that the legislative 
expression of rights cuts down in some way the rights we 
already enjoy. Three things need to be said about this proposition,. 
In the first place, I have already demonstrated to you that 
it is fallacious to believe that rights are already adequately 
protected. 
The second thing is that history has demonstrated time 
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and time again that giving written expression to rights is the 
best way of safeguarding them. The Barons of England, who 
insisted that their rights be set down by King John in Magna 
Carta, later interpreted by,the courts to extend to all, were 
quite sure that this was the best way to safeguard those 
rights against unwarranted executive intrusion. The framers of 
the Bill of Rights in 1689 were in no doubt that written 
expression was necessary to guarantee rights against intrusion 
by King and Parliament. Not only were those who drafted the 
American Bill of Rights satisfied that this was necessary, but 
we have seen in the last 20 years how the United States Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Warren was able to mine from that lode 
practical guarantees of equality and freedom in American society. 
The third thing is that it is possible to ensure by 
suitable drafting that existing rights are not cut down by 
legislative enactment of specified rights. This has been done in 
the Human Rights Bill. 
Then the idea has been given currency that the Human Rights 
Bill itself would authorise legislative and executive intrusion 
into existing rights. This seems to me to have resulted in 
part from a genuine misundering of the language of the Bill. 
But in part it has also come about by a deliberate campaign 
by those who oppose the bill, indeed, those who oppose the whole 
concept that there should be guarantees of rights. 
However desirable it might be in theory, it is not 
practicable to state rights in absolute terms that admit of 
not exceptions. Freedom of expression must be qualified by 
reasonable laws of defamation, by the need to preserve the peace -
to use an old-fashioned phrase. Freedom of assembly cannot be 
absolute; life would be impossible if a procession could be 
held in George Street in a peak traffic period. 
The International Covenant itself, because it was drafted 
to attract the maximum support, permits national legislation 
to make extensive derogations from the fundamental rights stated 
in the Covenant. The Human Rights. Bill also permits derogations, 
but much less extensively than the Covenant. The language 
used in the Bill in spelling out the derogations that 
may be permitted has given rise to misunderstanding. It has, 
for example, been believed that the M i l confers power on the 
Governor-General to make regulations that would detract from 
the rights specified. This is a complete misunderstanding 
of the purpose of the regulation-making power in the Bill and the 
language of the Bill will be revised before it is re-introduced 
to remove, so far as is reasonably possible, the source of these 
mis-understandings. 
But the proposition that the Bill itself constitutes a 
reduction of existing liberty is completely fallacious. I 
have already said enough to demonstrate how, in the absence of 
written guarantees binding on legislative bodies acting within 
their competence, existing rights, whether given by the 
common law or by legislation, may be set aside. 
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7. 
True it is that a Human Rights Act of the Australian 
Parliament does not bind that Parliament. This is another argument 
used by opponents of the Bill. An Act of the Australian Parliament 
would, however, bind state, territory and local government legislat-
ive bodies. It would nullify contrary regulations made -under 
Acts of the Australian Parliament, and, as the experience of the 
Senate Standing Committee on Ordinances and Regulations has 
shown, it is often in subordinate legislation where quite 
-unthinkingly substantial inroads are made into ordinary rights 
and freedoms. Although the Australian Parliament would itself be 
able to override a Human Rights Act, that Act would provide a 
valuable touchstone in judging the quality of other legislation 
and there would be considerable resistance to any Bill which 
appeared to detract from the operation of a Human Rights Act. 
Moreover, the operation in practice of a Human Rights Act 
would enable the courts to work out, in practical terms and 
case by case, the principles contained in it and so provide 
a surer guidance for the draftsmen of a Constitutional Bill 
of Rights when we are eventually able to tackle that task. 
Thus the enactment of a Human Rights Act by the Australian 
Parliament would' be a valuable first step towards the ultimate 
goal of entrenching a Bill of Rights in the Australian Constitution,, 
I do not want to say a great deal on the question 
whether the Australian Parliament should be asked to legislate on 
the basis of the External Affairs ^ower. This is not the 
occasion to engage in a detailed legal argument. I believe 
that the subject matter of a Bill tased on the International 
Covenant deals with a matter that is, to apply a test 
required by the High Court, indisputably international in 
character. The continued international concern over the 
protection of Human Rights within national boundaries is, I 
believe, ample demonstration of the international character of 
the subject matter. It must, of course, be acknowledged that in 
no case so far has the High Court had to grapple with the 
question whether Legislation that does not involve reciprocal 
or mutual rights or obligations between Australia and another 
country can be supported under the external affairs power,, 
But it would indeed be a fetter on our national sovereignty in 
the family of nations if the national Parliament could not 
implement the terms of a multi-lateral treaty solemnly drawn up 
after negotiations lasting many years and supported by successive 
Australian Governments. 
Apart from the question of Constitutional power, there is 
the argument that it should be left to the State Parliaments to 
ensure that these laws give effect to the Covenant. There are two 
short answers to that argument. First, if state laws 
do in fact conform to the covenant, then federal legislation 
embodying the covenant could not give any ground for legitimate 
complaint about interference in state matters. But state laws 
do not-, of course, satisfy the requirements of the covenant, and that 
brings me to the second answer. The states have not, in fact, 
acted in a comprehensive way to ensure conformity with the Covenant. 
Only now, for example, are some states getting around to giving a 
general right of privacy. This is being done in South Australia 
and Tasmania, but not elsewhere. 
Finally there is the argument that the Bill is inadequate. 
This is presented from two angles. First, some want more rights. Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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written in than are in the Covenant. This we cannot do if 
we are to rely on the external affairs power. Secondly, 
others say that the draftsman has departed too far from the 
terms of the Covenant. I have dealt with much of this 
argument elsewhere and I do not want to repeat it now. All 
that I need say now is that I am re-examining the terms of 
the Bill in the light of the criticisms that have been made, and 
that I would be glad to receive any proposals to improve the 
Bill that may emerge from the Seminar. 
I return to my topic of the United Nations and Human 
Right s. Regrettable, as I have said, the practice of many 
nations falls short, in varying degrees, cf the standards set 
by the United Nations. Regrettably, also, there are not 
yet enough ratifications of the International Covenants to bring 
them into force. Regrettably, again Australia has lagged in this 
respect. 
The present Government is determined that this situation 
should change. It is determined that Australian Society should be 
more free and more just. It is determined not only that the 
international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should be 
ratified and implemented in Australia but also that Australia 
should take an international lead in this important field which has 
so much bearing on the preservation of international legal order 
and world peace. 
Sydney. 
April 20, 1974 42/74 
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